

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

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13 November 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William A. Hebert, Jr.

SUBJECT : Strategic Warning

1. The Office of National Estimates does not monitor the hour-by-hour, day-by-day traffic on the activities within elements of Soviet military forces but relies on current intelligence reporting to keep abreast of major developments within those forces. Thus we cannot give precise answers to the questions posed in your 4 October memorandum but, instead, will give you our impressions of US intelligence strategic warning capabilities as we understand them, based on current intelligence reporting over the past several years.

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
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
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


b. One of the main factors which has served to reduce our capability to provide warning of a strategic attack, especially one directed against the US, has been the shift from bombers to missiles as the principal strike vehicles.

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